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Abstract:  
Several definitions of regulatory risk are known from the literature. From the 
perspective of regulatory reform it is important to differentiate between the   
impact of a given regulatory scheme on the firm’s risk exposure and the risk 
arising from discretionary behavior of regulatory agencies. Whereas the conse-
quences of effective regulation in principle are known and accepted, excessive 
regulatory discretion may cause a strong need for regulatory reform. Regulatory 
reform focussing on the regulatory base risk and the regulatory instrument risk 
has to solve the problem of the optimal division of labour between regulatory 
discretion and statutory constraints. Therefore, in this paper the design of a   
disaggregated regulatory mandate is elaborated; its major elements being the 
restriction of regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks and a disaggregated appli-
cation of sector-specific regulatory instruments. 
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1.  Alternative definitions of regulatory risk 
 
According to Kolbe, Tye, Myers (1993, p. 33) “there appears to be no generally 
accepted definition of regulatory risk”. However, the analysis of different ver-
sions of regulatory risks has a long tradition within the economic theory of regu-
lation (e.g. Ahn, Thompson, 1989), and becomes increasingly relevant within 
debates of regulatory reform of network industries (e.g. Ergas et al. 2001).  
 
Several definitions of regulatory risks are known from the literature. According 
to Wright et al. (2003, p. 118) the most obvious definition states that “regulatory 
risk arises whenever regulation affects the cost of capital of the regulated firm”.
1 
According to Kolbe et al. (1993, p. 33) “Here we define regulatory risk as the 
risk due to an asymmetric distribution of possible plant value outcomes”, and 
explicitly reject the application of the definition of regulatory risk as the impact 
of regulation on the cost of capital (see p. 33 footnote 56). Kolbe et al. (1993, 
pp. 37) focus on the regulatory risks due to some disallowances of the invested 
capital from the rate base or changes in the regulatory oversight. Ahn and 
Thompson (1989) analyze the way in which uncertainty in the application of a 
given regulatory instrument itself affects value (differing from the effect of 
regulation on the cost of capital). They analyze the risks involved in the process 
of rate of return regulation differentiating between the uncertainty of the initia-
tion of a rate case (trigging rule risk) as well as the uncertainty involved in the 
actual assignment of the allowed rate of return (setting rule risk). Buckland, Fra-
ser (2001) analyze the links between regulation and the risk faced by the regu-
lated firm investigating the extent to which observed variation in betas is associ-
ated with regulatory factors (regulatory structure, regulatory review procedures 
etc.). Robinson, Taylor (1998, p. 333) investigate the effects of heterogeneous 
regulatory intervention, considered as significant, on the variance of the returns 
to holding shares in regional electricity companies. Such regulatory events in-
clude price-control consultation procedures, interventions to change a price-cap, 
etc. “The very personalized nature of the UK regulatory regime and lack of a 
                                                 
1   For similar definitions see e.g. Ergas et al. (2001, p. 6): “Regulatory risk arises when 
the interaction of uncertainty and regulation changes the cost of financing the opera-
tions of a firm.”   2
broad regulatory framework is felt to engender unpredictability” (p. 337). The 
empirical analysis by Buckland and Fraser (2001) focuses on the impact of regu-
latory review procedures on the risks for the regulated firms involved. Ergas et 
al. (2001, p. 7) consider the existence of regulatory discretion as one type of 
regulatory risk.
2 Furthermore, the risk of regulatory inconsistencies motivates 
the definition “factors that are under the regulator’s control und the choice of 
which is regarded as uncertain by the regulated firm and investors” (Wright et 
al., 2003, pp. 118-119). 
 
 
2  Regulatory impact versus regulatory risk 
 
From the perspective of regulatory reform it is important to differentiate be-
tween the impact of a given regulatory scheme on the firm’s risk exposure and 
the risk arising from discretionary behavior of regulatory agencies. Whereas the 
consequences of effective regulation in principle are known and accepted, ex-
cessive regulatory discretion may cause a strong need for regulatory reform. 
 
Effective regulation may have an impact on all relevant performance parameters 
of the regulated firm. Within the framework of legal entry barriers and rate of 
return regulation the buffering hypothesis states that regulation should reduce 
conventional measures of owner risk. By buffering the firms against demand and 
cost changes the variability of profits should be lower than otherwise (Peltzman, 
1976, p. 230). In the context of free entry and price-cap regulation it can be 
shown that owner risk may increase or decrease. For the case of cost uncertainty 
the price-cap regulated firm’s profit varies more than the profit of the unregu-
lated firms, translating into a higher beta. Conversely, for the case of demand 
uncertainty the regulated firm’s profit varies less that the profit of the unregu-
lated firm, translating into a lower beta (Wright et al., 2003, pp. 122-129).  
 
                                                 
2   However, Ergas et al. (2001, p. 6) also include the impact of regulation as part of 
regulatory risk.   3
A familiar concept in regulatory finance to determine the cost of capital is the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which allows to differentiate between un-
systematic and systematic risk.  The systematic risk is measured by calculating 
the way its stock price moves in relation to market indices. The focus of regula-
tory impact is on the systematic risk measured by means of the beta-concept. As 
a consequence, effective regulation changes the systematic risk of the regulated 
activities, thereby (ceteris paribus) increasing or decreasing the opportunity 
costs of the invested capital (e.g. Knieps, 2003; Gaggero 2007). This perform-
ance impact of regulation, however, should never be a primary objective and 
justification for regulation, but only a (positive or negative) side effect. Myers 
(1972, p. 80) already stated (within the context of rate of return regulation) that 
the principle of “fair return” says nothing about whether regulation should aim 
to make utilities safe or risky enterprises. In competitive markets regulation 
should obviously never be introduced in order to mitigate the risk of the firms 
involved. In those parts of network industries where active and/or potential 
competition is absent, a fully competitive market is not a realistic alternative. In 
order to avoid the nirvana fallacy of regulation (Demsetz, 1969, p. 1) the risk of 
the business under regulated conditions has to be taken into account. Neither the 
risk of the unregulated monopolist nor the risks of the business under hypotheti-




3  Different types of regulatory risks 
 
Instead of the impact of an ex ante well known regulatory action, regulatory risk 
mirrors the uncertainty of regulated firms and investors, due to discretionary 
regulatory behavior. Regulatory impact should therefore not be confused with 
regulatory risk. Consequently, the broad definition of regulatory risk, i.e. regula-
tory risk exists whenever regulation affects the cost of capital of the regulated 
firm, should be rejected.  
 
                                                 
3   For the discussion of alternative reference points of risks, in particular if competition 
is only hypothetical, see Myers (1972, p. 79) and Buckland, Fraser (2001, p. 879).   4
Regulatory risk due to discretionary regulatory behavior may occur on different 
levels of regulatory activities. Within the context of the application of a specific 
regulatory instrument regulatory discretion may cause application risk. Ahn and 
Thompson (1989), for example, analyze the risk involved in the application of 
rate of return regulation caused by uncertainties of the triggering rule (the timing 
of rate procedures) and the setting rule (the allowed rate of returns). Application 
of price-cap regulation is also involved in setting risk due to periodic interven-
tion of regulators (resetting RPI – X, quality control, changing the commodity 
basket etc.). 
 
In the literature on regulatory risk the most attention has been devoted to the 
truncation risk due to an asymmetric distribution of possible plant value out-
comes. This identifies the risk of some disallowance of the invested capital and 
the subsequent negative incentives for investments caused by expected regula-
tory opportunism. Translated into the context of the truncation problem, stated 
e.g. in Gans and King (2003), ex post regulatory opportunism of the regulatory 
agency is taken as (exogenously) given. In the decision trees considered, the 
only asymmetry between ex ante and ex post is a random state of the world, 
which materialises between the ex post and ex ante periods, observable as com-
mon knowledge. Due to the sequential nature of investment decisions (ex ante) 
and regulation of access tariffs (ex post) a regulation-induced hold-up problem 
would arise. The truncation problem would result in rewarding only ex post  




Although some authors point out the relevancy of the regulatory framework, a 
common denominator of the literature on regulatory risk is to take the regulatory 
framework (regulatory basis, regulatory instruments) as exogenous. As a conse-
quence, the regulatory base risk as well as the regulatory instrument risk is not 
considered. As long as the competency to specify the areas as well as the in-
struments of sector specific regulation is delegated to regulators a clear and   
                                                 
4   Under certain conditions it can even be shown that regulated access prices equal to 
short run variable costs would result in a unique Nash-equilibrium and the utility 
would not invest (Newbery, 2000, pp. 34-36).   5
economically well founded regulatory basis will not be applied. Market power 
regulation may either be oversized including competitive markets or undersized 
leaving areas of network specific market power unregulated. Irrespective of 
whether the application of a specific regulatory instrument increases or de-
creases regulatory risks, its application may be justified or not. Application of 
price-cap regulation in competitive parts of network industries may reduce eco-
nomic risk but should be rejected because functioning market signals are dis-
turbed. If application of price-cap regulation increases regulatory risk due to 
changing demand decisions this does not constitute a valid argument against this 
regulation. Although an increase of risk may also be in the interest of a firm as 
long as it is concomitant with increasing expected profit, the focus of producer 
interest chosen in the literature of regulatory finance seems too narrow. Instead, 
the change of consumer surplus as a consequence of regulation should also be 
taken into account. It may even be the case that increasing risk for firms is nec-
essary for increasing consumer welfare. 
 
 
4  Compensation of regulatory risk? 
 
Since the literature on regulatory finance takes the regulatory framework as 
exogenously given, its focus is on application risk as well as truncation risk. 
Whereas with respect to application risk explicit recommendations remain vague 
(e.g. Ahn, Thompson, 1989, p. 256; Wright et al., 2003), the major effort is on 
dealing with the truncation problem. Regarding compensation we have to differ-
entiate between ex ante and ex post truncation. 
 
As Kolbe et al. (1993, pp. 25-27 and 46-51) have shown, the risk of ex ante-
truncation due to the probability that the investors earn less than the promised 
rate of return can be calculated and also compensated by means of a risk pre-
mium. In the case of ex post truncation this solution does not work, because the 
promise of a risk premium would encounter the same commitment problem (see 
Kolbe et al., 1993, pp. 53ff.; Gans/King, 2003, p. 166). In this context the role of 
access holidays has also been discussed. Access holidays mean a significant pe-
riod during which an investor is free from access regulation. The idea is that   6
such a holiday will increase investment incentives by allowing profits unhin-
dered by regulatory intervention (Gans, King, 2003, p. 164). 
 
The question arises whether access holidays are the adequate answer to the prob-
lem of regulatory opportunism. The starting point is how markets solve the 
problem of opportunism. Opportunistic behaviour between market participants 
can be credibly excluded by means of incentive compatible contracts. As long as 
all parties may benefit from the ex ante investment decisions, incentives occur to 
apply credible devices for dealing with ex post cheating behaviour. Under the 
assumption of complete information a well-specified contract can be designed 
between all parties involved, creating incentives for ex ante irreversible invest-
ments and no ex post cheating incentives (e.g. Kleindorfer, Knieps, 1982). As 
Williamson (1983, p. 526) has shown, a security bond equal in amount to the 
irreversible investment would serve the purpose of a perfect hostage. In a world 
of incomplete information and subsequent incentives for idiosyncratic contracts 
(e.g. Williamson, 1979) the ex ante risk of investments cannot be perfectly de-
termined. Consequently, perfect hostages to avoid opportunistic behaviour by 
the firm involved do not exist; nevertheless, adequate imperfect hostages can be 
developed (Williamson, 1983, pp. 527 f.).  
 
Under the assumption of a welfare-maximising regulator in a similar way a 
complete incentive-compatible regulatory contract can be implemented. In par-
ticular, instead of postulating ex post regulatory power, under such circum-
stances of complete information it is feasible to design a complete regulatory 
contract ex ante such as to allow the compensation of the ex ante risk of   
irreversible investment. In a world of incomplete information again only an in-
complete regulatory contract can be designed.  
 
Since it is well known that regulatory authorities cannot be forced into welfare-
maximising behaviour, the question arises whether opportunistic behaviour can 
be excluded by the design and implementation of adequate hostages. Within the 
relevant institutional context it cannot be expected that the regulatory authorities 
can be disciplined by such an adequate hostage. Regulatory authorities as part of 
the bureaucracy cannot be fined for inadequate behaviour. As a consequence, it   7
is only by means of a statutory constraint that opportunistic behaviour by the 
regulatory authorities can be disciplined. Therefore the regulatory agency has to 
be committed by statutes to allow the compensation of the ex ante risk of irre-
versible investment.   
 
 
5  Reduction of regulatory risk by regulatory reform 
 
5.1  The concept of the regulatory mandate 
 
Only a few institutional reform proposals appear in the literature, all focussing 
on the regulatory truncation risk: 
 
“[C]onstitutional limits on regulatory discretion can reduce the risk of 
regulatory failure provided that the utility responds as vigorously as be-
fore to any deviation. Whether this is plausible is an interesting question.” 
(Newbery, 2000, p. 47) 
 
“Eliminate asymmetric payoff distributions by changing regulatory prac-
tices”  
(Kolbe, Tye, Myers, 1993, S. 34) 
 
“[C]hange in regulatory oversight …” (Kolbe, Tye, Myers, 1993, S. 38) 
 
Regulatory reform focussing on the regulatory base risk and the regulatory in-
strument risk has to solve the problem of the optimal division of labour between 
regulatory discretion and statutory constraints (rules). Statutory constraints are 
necessary to avoid regulatory incentives with respect to overregulation by ex-
tending the regulatory basis and by detailed price regulation. Statutory con-
straints may also guarantee the necessary regulatory interventions. Nevertheless, 
regulatory discretion should not be completely avoided. The required regulatory 
base may change over time requiring a careful regulator initiating phasing-in or 
phasing-out of sector-specific regulation. Regulatory discretion may also be re-
quired for a proper application of regulatory instruments. For example, the risk 
involved in the application of rate of return regulation caused by uncertainties   8
may reflect the necessities of dealing with changing market conditions over 
time. Similar conclusions also hold for the application of price-cap regulation. 
 
In order to guarantee consistent economically founded regulatory actions, the 
development and the implementation of sector-symmetric statutory constraints 
seems necessary. Therefore, in the following the design of a disaggregated regu-
latory mandate is elaborated; its major elements are the restriction of regulation 
to monopolistic bottlenecks and a disaggregated application of sector-specific 
regulatory instruments (Knieps, 2005; Knieps, 2007, chap. 9). 
 
 
5.2  Limiting regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
The reform potentials on the level of network infrastructure and the remaining 
regulatory problems are focused on the basic question whether the providers of 
network services need access to a network infrastructure with characteristics of a 
monopolistic bottleneck (e.g. Knieps, 1997, p. 327; Knieps, 2006a, pp. 53-55). 
Remaining reform potentials therefore centre on the vertical perspective of non-
discriminatory access to infrastructures complementary to the network service 
level. However, this does not imply the necessity of an end-to-end regulation 
including the competitive segments. 
 
The conditions necessary for a monopolistic bottleneck facility are fulfilled 
(1)  if a facility is essential in order to reach customers, i.e. if there is no sec-
ond or third such facility, in other words if no active substitute is avail-
able. This is the case if, due to bundling advantages, there is a natural mo-
nopoly situation, meaning that one supplier can make the facility available 
more cost-efficiently than several suppliers; 
(2)  and if at the same time the facility cannot be duplicated on reasonable 
economic terms, i.e. if there is no potential substitute available. This is the 
case if the facility's costs are irreversible and if, as a result, there is no 
functioning second hand market for these facilities.   9
The criterion for the localisation of the remaining sector-specific need for regu-
lation within network infrastructures is always the question whether access to 
these facilities is an indispensable prerequisite for offering a complementary 
service at an upstream or downstream production level. It is therefore necessary 
to ensure non-discriminatory access to the bottleneck through tailor-made   
bottleneck regulation. In all other network areas, however, the situation is com-
pletely different because there is active and potential competition. 
 
The bottleneck theory is not a theory developed specifically for a single network 
sector. Whereas there are no monopolistic bottlenecks on the level of network 
services and infrastructure management, monopolistic bottlenecks do exist on 
the infrastructure level. Examples are: airports, railway infrastructure, electricity 
transmission and distribution networks. Nevertheless, not every network infra-
structure does possess the characteristics of a natural monopoly in combination 
with irreversible costs. For example, supra-regional high-pressure gas pipeline 
transmission in Germany is not a monopolistic bottleneck, due to the broad 
competition potential created by pipelines operated by project companies, 
through ownership in undivided shares and through access options to competing 
backbone pipelines (Knieps, 2002). Long-distance telecommunications networks 
are characterised by the existence of alternative network providers and the   
remaining bottleneck problem is limited to the local loop (e.g. Knieps, 1997,  
pp. 331 f.; Laffont, Tirole, 2000, p. 98).  
 
 
5.3  Disaggregated application of sector-specific regulatory instruments 
 
Regulating the parts of network infrastructures characterised as monopolistic 
bottlenecks remains an important task even after full market opening. Where 
network sectors have monopolistic bottleneck areas, they need specific regula-
tion to discipline remaining market power. This requires, above all, symmetric 
access to the monopolistic bottleneck areas for all active and potential providers 
of network services to allow (active and potential) competition to fully develop. 
Moreover, price cap regulation should be applied, limited to the monopolistic   10
bottleneck areas. It is important to differentiate between unregulated pricing 
structure and regulated price level (e.g. Knieps, 2006b, pp. 17-20). 
 
Price cap regulation in the monopolistic bottleneck areas and accounting separa-
tion are sufficiently capable of disciplining the remaining market power and en-
suring non-discriminatory access. Detailed input regulation contradicts the spirit 
of a price cap regulation. One of the main reasons for limiting the scope of regu-
lation to the level of output prices is to keep the information needs of the regula-
tory authority as low as possible. This will not only reduce regulatory work, but 
also create entrepreneurial incentives to seek out cost savings and innovative 
price structures. The decisive advantage of price cap regulation over the individ-
ual rate approval procedure is the fact that the former does not impede the entre-
preneurial quest for innovative price structures. 
 
Not only in competitive subparts of networks, but also in the monopolistic bot-
tleneck areas pricing structures should be flexible und the result of endogenous 
market process. A salient feature of the markets for network capacities (even 
after the full opening of the market) is the fact that economies of scope and scale 
play a significant role in the provision of services. Competitive prices must 
therefore be allowed to freely find their level between stand-alone costs and 
short-term marginal costs, depending on demand. An abuse of market power 
cannot be said to exist in this case. Upper limits for access charges on the basis 
of uniform mark-ups on incremental costs are not consistent with the new   
competitive environment. Rather, the short-term marginal costs (variable costs) 
represent the short-term price floor without constituting predatory pricing. Long-
term incremental costs, on the other hand, which also contain the relevant fixed 
costs, represent the long-term price floor. 
 
Furthermore, market-oriented allocation of overhead costs is necessary. The 
coverage of product group-specific joint costs and company-specific common 
costs must be determined in accordance with the prevailing demand conditions 
(price elasticity of demand). The information required for this purpose is spon-
taneously generated in the market. Therefore, the resulting allocation of over-
head costs may be determined only ex post. Administrative allocation proce-  11
dures established by the regulator ex ante are fundamentally incapable of antici-
pating the overhead cost allocation which should be an endogenous result of the 
market process. The information deficit of the regulatory authorities is too great, 
especially considering the substantial variation of the relevant demand elastic-
ities over time (time of day, season, etc.). Both at European and national levels 
there is a requirement for discrimination-free access to monopolistic bottleneck 
services at non-discriminatory prices. These regulations, however, may not be 
allowed to restrict the diverse welfare-increasing potential of price differentia-
tion in the markets for infrastructure capacities. 
 
As already indicated (short-run) variable costs represent the short-term price 
floor and (long-run) incremental costs the long-term price floor: in addition, 
both the product group-specific joint costs and the company-specific common 
costs (overhead costs) must be covered (viability condition). Therefore a sub-
stantial price differentiation potential exists which should be exploited for the 
benefit of consumers, regardless of the underlying market form selected (Willig, 
1978). In order to evaluate different price differentiation schemes in economic 
terms, the schemes must be compared in their entirety. It is inadmissible to infer 
general conclusions about the welfare effects of price differentiation from arbi-
trary comparisons of individual prices. In particular, a price differentiation re-
quired to ensure the survival of the network operator must not be confused with 
anti-competitive discrimination. In fact, it is the instrument of price differentia-
tion that allows for undistorted infrastructure and service competition. 
 
The welfare-increasing effects of price differentiation should not be impeded by 
asymmetrical regulatory intervention. The development of innovative rate struc-
tures must be an option open to all providers. One should not hamper the devel-
opment of new rate structures by extending the requirement for rate approval by 
the regulatory authority to cover new rates as well. All market participants 
should have the opportunity of providing optional rates, multiple rates, non-
linear price structures, etc.  
 
 
   12
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